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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FRANK LI FANG, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 940717 - CA 
Category No, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to Section 78-3a-3(2)(d) Utah Code (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether the Utah Stalking Statute, Section 76-5-106.5, Utah 
Code (1953, as amended), is in violation of the Due Process 
Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution and the Utah Constitution, since it is impermissibly 
overbroad and vague on its face and as applied to the Defendant, 
because it does not sufficiently distinguish everyday permissible 
conduct from conduct which is prohibited, and because it does not 
provide adequate guidelines for its application and cannot be 
applied uniformly? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Provo City, a Municipal 
Corporation, with the offense of stalking, a Class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Section 76-5-106.5, Utah Code (1953, as amended), 
as adopted by Provo City as 9/76-5-106.5, Provo City Ordinances. 
Because of the Defendant's apparently disturbed mental 
condition, the Fourth Judicial District Court, Honorable Judge, 
Steven L. Hansen presiding, ordered a psychological evaluation of 
the Defendant, pursuant to which, the Defendant was found 
competent to stand trial. 
Defendant submitted a Motion to Dismiss based on the 
unconstitutionality of Section 76-5-106.5, the Utah Statute for 
the crime of stalking. The trial court denied the motion to 
dismiss and found the Defendant guilty of the crime of stalking. 
(Copy of Ruling attached in addendum). 
On November 15, 1994, Defendant, by and through his counsel 
of record, filed a Notice of Appeal. (Copy of Notice of Appeal 
attached in Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Steven 
L. Hansen of the Fourth Circuit Court of Utah County, State of 
Utah, rendered on October 11, 1994, denying Defendant's motion to 
2 
dismiss and finding Defendant guilty of stalking. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was charged with the crime of stalking Ms. Kelly 
Roring ("Roring") subsequent to an incident which took place at 
the parking lot of the Physician1s Plaza, at the Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center in Provo, Utah, on May 26, 1994 [Non-Jury 
Trial Tape Transcription ("Transcript") at 51]. 
Defendant had previously been served with a Temporary 
Restraining Order, followed by a Permanent Injunction, against 
approaching Roring in violation of the Injunction. (Copy of 
Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction attached in addendum). 
According to Roring, Defendant accosted her in a threatening 
manner and used abusive language in accusing her of having him 
followed. This altercation led to intervention by other 
witnesses and the security staff of the Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center,, 
Roring testified at the trial that the Defendant never 
threatened her or any of her family members with physical harm 
(Transcript at 70-73). Furthermore, the Transcript is replete 
with testimony from the witnesses and the security staff that the 
Defendant never made any threats to harm Roring or any of her 
family members physically. Roring testified that she had known 
3 
the Defendant since January of 1990 (Transcript at 16). The 
Defendant testified to having had a sexual relationship with 
Roring (Transcript at 228) . He also testified that she was never 
scared of him (Transcript at 239). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Section 76-5-106.5, Utah Code (1953# as amended), the Utah 
Stalking Statute ("Statute") is impermissibly overbroad and 
vague. As such, it does not distinguish between prohibited 
conduct and conduct that is not prohibited, in a way that can be 
understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. Also, it does 
not establish minimal guidelines for its enforcement in a manner 
such that the Statute can be uniformly applied. 
POINT II 
The Statute violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, the Statute is constitutionally invalid 
facially, and is also invalid as applied to the Defendant. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
Standard for Consideration of the Issue, 
In State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993), the 
constitutionality of the Utah injury to jail statute was at 
issue. The court held that "We review the trial court's decision 
on the constitutionality of the statute for correctness, 
according no deference to its legal conclusions." Id. at 465 
(citations omitted). 
In Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989), 
The Supreme Court of Utah reviewed a Provo City municipal 
ordinance prohibiting unlawful sexual acts. The Court said, "We 
note the appropriate standard of review at the outset. Because 
the resolution of this case depends entirely on questions of law, 
we accord no particular deference to the rulings of the circuit 
and district courts on any of the points presented. Id. at 456 
(citations omitted). 
Similarly, this court should determine the constitutionality 
of the Statute without deferring to the circuit court's ruling on 
the issue. 
5 
THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS OVERBROAD IN 
PROHIBITING LEGITIMATE FREE SPEECH AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS VOID-
FOR-VAGUENESS AS IT DOES NOT DEFINE THE PROHIBITED CONDUCT IN A 
MANNER, THAT ORDINARY PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 
•Pkg statute is constitutionally infix m because it is 
'overbroad and vaguely worded Wher a pt-3i-n*-o or* n-rrH nance is 
faced w:i tl 1 overbr eadtl 1 and vag i lenes " au. Lacks, the first task of 
the court is to determine whether the enactment makes unlawful a 
substantial amount of constitutiona . 
Hoffman Es ta..t...e s v., IfaaJFIipsicle, Hoffman Estates, Inc. 455 u s 
489, 494 (1982) , "if it tioets - ">t *-hen the overbreadth challenge 
must tail 4-iiiii w< niu.il I II«MI examine l hr tafia I ''aqut-ness 
challenge. Id. If it does, it may be lie I d facially invalid even 
if it. also legitimate application. City of Houston v. Hill, *- I 
/) . 
Therefore, this court: sliouJ d first check the validity of the 
Statute for overbreadth, ai :i d tl: lei I proceed tc • a c Dnstd ti it d oi lal 
analysis of the statute under vagueness. 
Under the "overbreadth" doctrine, an overbroad str .. - .,t 
clii ] ] s the exerci se of free speech, under the tirst amendment is 
subject to constitutional attack Willden, 768 P.2d at 457. 
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, art. ii:u I. a ted by line 
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United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, unless a 
statute defines an "offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement," it will be found unconstitutional. 461 U.S. 352, 
357 (1983) . The Court further said that if an enactment does not 
clearly define its prohibitions and, even more importantly, 
establish minimal guidelines for its enforcement, it violates due 
process. Id. 
A. The Statute is unconstitutional because it is overbroad and 
chills the exercise of free speech under the first amendment. 
As a preliminary matter, the Defendant has the standing to 
raise the issue of overbreadth under the holdings of Willdenf 768 
P.2d 455 (Utah 1989), and Logan City v. Huber. 786 P.2d 1372 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1990) . In Willdenf the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
Willden relies on the federal first amendment 
"overbreadth" standing doctrine, designed to give 
standing to anyone who is subject to an overbroad 
statute that chills the exercise of first amendment 
rights of others. The irationale for granting such 
standing is that the constitutionally protected 
interests infringed by such statutes are so important 
that their protection need not await the perfect 
plaintiff. 
Willdenr at 457 (quoting New York v. Ferber. 458 U.S. 747 768-69 
(1982) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Huberf the Court of 
7 
Appeals held that, arguendo, the appld cabi ] i ty of federal 
amendment principles was assumed in Utah courts. 7 8 6 P,2d at 
13 75, M 10. Therefore, Defendant does have standing to 
chcil ieiige 1 In SI .it nl c mndiM I he ilncl t inc of overbreadth. 
In Huberf the court agreed wi th appell^; : Huber '- holding 
that the Logan City "disorderly conduct ;- .• . j 
abi is: "^ ' e ] angi lage spoken with intent ' to cause public 
inconvenience mnoyance, • alam* recklessly creating a risk 
thereof1 was ^ " 7 5/z. 
Huber was- charged with using abusive language against two pol ice 
officers wt~ -<••-•— i-ry^na tn question him, regarding a tr affic 
viol Hi ion, -V • .r t noted that the municipalities 
use of the expansive term "abusive language" and its express 
•intent t-o n^nalize speech ti. . • . > 
oersons who may not even be its t a i y ^ ieit tiiem una* . - *o 
construe th*: ordinance so as to carry out legislative intent 
:
 Tl: le coi irt struck down the 
offending ordinance and held: 
The ordinance, far from being narrowly drawn, applies 
to all harsh insulting words that recklessly create a 
risk of inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, not just ^w 
those that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of 
violence by the person to whom, individually, the 
remark is addressed." Indeed, the Logan ordinance does 
not even require that the abusive language be directed 
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at the person who hears .... In short, the ordinance 
unconstitutionally punishes as disorderly conduct a 
significant amount of protected verbal expression, 
including criticism and challenge, vulgarities and 
remonstrations, whether it is directed at a police 
officer, an ordinary citizen, or one who is not even 
present, without regard for its likely impact on any 
actual addressee. ... Logan City ordinance ... confers 
virtually unrestrained power on police to arrest and 
charge persons with a violation. 
Huber, at 1376 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, the Statute at issue contains language 
proscribing a "course of conduct" which means, "repeatedly 
maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person or 
repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or ..." (App. at 
A-2). Under the express language of the Statute, one would be in 
technical violation and guilty of the crime of stalking if one 
does the following: 
a) intentionally and knowingly, 
b) on two occasions, 
c) maintain a visual or physical proximity to a specific 
person, 
d) that would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional 
distress, 
e) and the actor knows or should know that the specific 
person will suffer emotional distress, 
9 
... uj-dtress in the 
specific person. 
Under the Statute i f one int eui i uiid I I) approaches a 
,er^ o r a repairman, ox a restauranteur, to 
complain about perceived insufficiencies with a product or a 
service, and ml I Ji* - pi "t unm I i i.t <<n i 1114 in i In- i umpLaints should 
reasonably suffer emotional distress from such a confrontation, 
the complainant knew the person would be disf n^bud, md I lnj 
person <H"I U I I i , w di it i essed, then: one would be guilty o£ the 
crime of stalking and subject to the full force of the legal 
justice system. 
Furthermore, any number of legitimate activities can satisfy 
"course of conduct" as defined by the Statute, "Repeatedly . 
tticiint d i in in< | ii v i ' in i. 1 i i p h y s i c a l pi o x u n i t y t u a p e r s o n " c a n 
easily include all people with whom we work, study, and worship, 
as well as our neighbors and merchants and no l;orth„ Finally, 
"repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats" would encompass 
all speech, not just "fighting words11 as war ^he situation in 
Hufrer. 
For all these reasons, the Statute is unsound. It 
proscribes activd ties that are clearly constituL I< Ji'iaJ, under .basic 
f ree speee h i igi it s LU JL imit anti - social 
1U 
activities, the Statute has impinged upon much more that is 
legitimate and constitutionally protected. As such, the Statute 
fails to pass constitutional muster under the doctrine of 
overbreadth. Therefore, subject to the mandates of Hoffman 
Estates, this court should find the Statute unconstitutional. 
B. The Statute is unconstitutional under the void-for-
vagueness doctrine because it does not define what conduct is 
prohibited in a manner, that ordinary people can understand. 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been stated as follows 
in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972): 
It is a basic principle of due process that an 
enactment is void for vcigueness if it prohibitions are 
not clearly defined. Veigue laws offend several 
important values. First, because we assume that man is 
free to steer between lciwful and unlawful conduct, we 
insist that laws give the person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws 
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. 
Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is 
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards 
for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application. 
State v. Archambeau, restated the same concept by saying 
that "[t]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute 
or ordinance define an "offense with sufficient definiteness that 
ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in 
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a manner that does not encoui: age ar b:i tr a r y ai id d:i sci: :i 11:1:3 natorj 
enforcement," 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991) (citing 
Kolender v. Lawsonf 4 61 U.S, at 3 57), "More impor l.tian 
ac -.. Hie ;i;i^ qui reitient that a legislature establish 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.1" "Tt in a basic 
principle of due "process that an enactn- dd fnr sMqueness 
a ctre n o t d e a r l y defined. Archambeau» at 92 7 
(citations omitted). 
Tn the Statute at :i ssue, ther e ::i s a si 1 ig 1 il ar lack of any 
S U C H guidelines whatsoever. As with the problem, of overbreadth, 
any number nf ] r-qitiimt-e activities can comprise o1 .mil satisfy 
rement as defined in the Statute to 
qualify for criminal punishment foi stalking Agadn, "repeatedly 
maintaining a visual, or physicaJ pio.x j m i l y i 1 peiuon" <iuej' not 
cle- * ; line a boundaries oi lawful and unlawful behavior. 
Such acnvjr^ r»..r easily include a person* s close acquaintances 
ai id , -c U L une l u m i n a l justice 
system for legal activities. Ar; r.uch, <iu m d i n a r y person would 
be hard put to divine the meaning ul IIK> St ,il 111 IJ , "Therefore, the 
-. . .
 ; dLoul of the stipulations of Kolender and 
should be declared unconstitutional under the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. 
1 2 
S t a t e v . Ramsey. 782 P . 2 d 480 , 486 (Utah 1 9 8 9 ) , h e l d t h a t 
"the language . . . give adequate warning of the conduct proscribed 
and mark boundaries sufficiently for judges and jur ies fair ly to 
administer the law." In the absence of expl ici t guidelines that 
can be followed for law enforcement purposes, th is requirement 
cannot be sat isf ied. Because the Statute does not clearly define 
criminal conduct and proscribes conduct which i s constitutionally 
protected, those who administer the law will be lef t to interpret 
the Statute based upon their own predilections as to what 
ac t iv i ty constitutes a crime. 
Thus, the Statute fa i l s both the overbreadth and the void-
for-vagueness scrutiny and i s unconstitutional.1 
1
 Three States have recently ruled on stalking statutes, in Commonwealth 
v. Kwiatowski. 637 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1994), Massachusetts held that i ts 
statute was facially vague and hence unconstitutional. The primary objection 
to the Massachusetts statute originated from the word "repeatedly" and i ts 
interpretation with i ts relationship to the words "following" and 
"harassment." In Pallas v. State. 636 So.2d 1358 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1994), 
Florida upheld i ts stalking statute noting that their statute clearly provides 
that "constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning 
of "course of conduct." The court also noted that there must be a "credible 
threat made with the intent to place the victim in reasonable fear of death or 
bodily injury." In Wool folk v. Commonwealth. 447 S.E.2d 530 (Va. App. 1994), 
Virginia upheld i ts stalking statute noting that since their statute requires 
a specific intent in conjunction with more than one overt act, a person of 
ordinary intelligence is given a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
proscribed and that since conduct, not only speech is required, the statute is 
neither vague nor overbroad. 
The significance of these cases to Utah's Statute is that unlike the 
Utah Statute, the Massachusetts statute does not encompass language as 
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POINT I I 
THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND IS INVALID FACIALLY 
AND IS ALSO INVALID AS APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANT 
S t a t e v . P h a r r i s s t a t e s t h a t an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague 
s t a t u t e v i o l a t e s t h e Due P r o c e s s and t h e E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n C l a u s e 
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n s . 846 P . 2 d 454 , 465-67 
(Ut . C t . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e r e f o r e , u n d e r t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment 
of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n which g u a r a n t e e s a l l c i t i z e n s 
due p r o c e s s and e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e l a w s , and a l s o u n d e r 
S e c t i o n s 7 and 24 of A r t i c l e I of t h e U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n a f f o r d i n g 
s i m i l a r p r o t e c t i o n t o a l l c i t i z e n s , t h e S t a t u t e s h o u l d be h e l d 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . 
U n l i k e t h e s t a t u t e s of some o t h e r s t a t e s t h a t h a v e been 
s c r u t i n i z e d f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y ( s u p r a , n . 1 . p . 1 1 - 1 2 ) , t h e 
Utah S t a t u t e ' s " c o u r s e of c o n d u c t " i s s a t i s f i e d by b e i n g i n 
prohibited conduct; the Florida statute excludes use of language alone; and 
the Virginia statute requires a specific intent in conjunction with more than 
one overt act and that i t is conduct and not speech which is proscribed. 
Utah's Statute that plainly defines "course of conduct" to include language 
alone violates both the Utah and the United States' Constitutions' freedom of 
speech protections. Of further significance is the fact that Massachusetts 
found i ts statute unconstitutionally vague because "repeatedly" was not 
clearly defined. The statute did not make clear whether a pattern of conduct 
or series of events had to be "repeated" or whether the harassment had to be 
repeated. 
14 
visual or physical proximity to a person twice. It does not 
require a plan, or a pattern or a series of events, two isolated 
accidental encounters would suffice according to the plain 
language, therefore, the Statute violates the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and also the Due Process Clause of 
both the United States and the Utah Constitution. 
Not only is the Statute facially unconstitutional in its 
existing form, it is also invalid as applied to the Defendant. 
It prevents the Defendant from repeatedly maintaining a visual or 
physical proximity to Roring, even if such proximity may be 
completely accidental or non-threatening, and it also prevents 
the Defendant's constitutionally guaranteed free speech rights by 
making language alone the concomitant of the Statutefs violation. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah stalking Statute is unconstitutional because it 
fails both the overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness tests. It 
impermissibly restricts fundamental rights guaranteed under the 
United States and the Utah Constitutions. As such, this Court 
should find the Statute unconstitutional and should reverse the 
Circuit Court's ruling denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss 
and finding the Defendant guilty of the crime of stalking. 
15 
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THOMAS H. MEANS (2222) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "LH 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 373-4912 
JFILSD 
:
€OURT OF 4#5&*fe 
EST THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR 
STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF PROVO, 
vs. 
FRANK LIFANG, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
AMENDED CERTIFICATE 
OF DELIVERY 
Case No. 940717-CA 
COMES NOW Defendant/Appellant, by and through his attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, 
who hereby respectfully advises this Court that the Certificate of Delivery attached to the Brief oi 
Appellant is inaccurate, in that counsel for Defendant/Appellant neglected to deliver copies of the Briei 
of Appellant to opposing counsel on the date indicated in the original Certificate of Delivery. By this 
Amended Certificate of Delivery, counsel for Defendant/Appellant hereby certifies that on the 30th da> 
of June, 1995, four (4) true and correct copies of Defendant/Appellant's brief on appeal were hand 
delivered to Mr. Vernon F. "Rick" Romney, Deputy Provo City Attorney. 
DATED this J J day of July, 1995. 
ALDRIOCNELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
11 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
2 I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this day of July, 1995, a copy of the 
foregoing Amended Certificate of Delivery to the following: 
Vernon F. "Rick" Romney 
Deputy Provo City Attorney 
PO Box 1849 
Provo, UT 84603 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of June, 1995. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered, this 12th day of June, 1995, four (4) copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to the following: 
Vernon F. (Rick) Romney 
Provo City Attorney 
50 South 300 West 
Provo, UT 84601 
APPENDIX 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship - Due Process of law - Equal 
Protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Appendix-1 
UTAH CODE 
76-5-106.5. Definitions - Crime of stalking. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a 
visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying 
verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or a 
combination thereof directed at or toward a person. 
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, 
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the 
household or who regularly resided in the household within the 
prior six months. 
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of 
his immediate family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the 
specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury 
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily 
injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person. 
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
FRANK LIFANG, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 941-2136MS 
DATE: OCTOBER 11, 1994 
RULING 
STEVEN L. HANSEN, JUDGE 
Non-jury trial was held September 20, 1994. Rick Romney represented the State, and 
Thomas Means represented the Defendant, charged with the crime of stalking.1 The matter 
is now before the Court for ruling on the Defendant's motion to dismiss, and for 
determination of his guilt or innocence. Having heard the testimony of witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, and being fully advised, the Court now makes this ruling denying the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss and finding Defendant guilty of stalking. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS DENIED 
The Defendant has moved the Court for dismissal on grounds that the Utah stalking 
statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, in violation of the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the United States and Utah constitutions.2 It is well established that one 
'Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1994). 
2U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const, art. VII, XXIV. 
1 
who challenges a statute as unconstitutional bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity.3 
The Court finds the Defendant has not met this burden. His motion to dismiss accordingly is 
denied. 
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF STALKING 
At trial, the Court heard testimony and received evidence that established by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant engaged in conduct proscribed by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1994). The Court finds the State has met its burden of proof and finds 
the Defendant is guilty of the crime of stalking. The clerk of the Court therefore is directed 
to set the matter for sentencing at a time convenient to counsel. 
Dated this eleventh day of October, 1994. 
3Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake. 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991). 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this seventeenth day of October, 1994: 
Rick F. Romney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(hand-delivered) 
Thomas H. Means 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
Attorney for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-022 
CARMA B. SMITH 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
3 
THOMAS H. MEANS (2222) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, UT 84603-0200 
Telephone: 3 7 3-4912 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FRANK LIFANG, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 941-1125 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through his attorney of record, 
Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to §77-1-6(1)(g), §77-18a-l(1)(a), 
§77-32-1(5), and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure number 26, who 
hereby gives notice that he does appeal from that judgment of 
guilty entered by this Court in this matter on the 18th day of 
October of 1994. 
DATED this ! *' day of November, 1994. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
7 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this ' -,x' 
day of November, 1994, a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to 
the following: 
Rick Romney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PO Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Frank Lifang 
c/o Irene Tafoya 
650 North Atlantis 
Orem, Utah 84058 
K. Mifflin Williams III, #3489 
KING & ISAACSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
A Professional Corporation 
4 Triad Center, Suite 825 
salt L&Xe City, Utah 84180 
Telephone: (801) 532-170Q 
IN THE DI8TRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KELLIE W. RORING, ) 
) JUDGMENT GRANTING 
Plaintiff, ) PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
VS. ) Civil No. 940901302CV 
FRANK LIFANG, ) Judge Glenn K, Iwasaki 
Defendant, ) 
Plaintiff in the above-entitled case, commenced an action in 
the above-entitled Court against the above-named defendant 
praying that defendant refrain from certain acts complained in 
the Complaint, and more particularly set forth h«rein» 
A Temporary Restraining order was given by order of this 
court, made and entered on February 24, 199 4. Because it was not 
possible to personally serve the defendant with the Temporary 
Restraining Order issued on said date, a Second Temporary Rest-
raining Order was issued by the court on March 4/ 199 4/ and 
defendant was personally served with paid Second Temporary Rest-
raining order as well as Summons and Complaint on March 7, 1994, 
The defendant, having been informed of his right to seek 
legal representation through an attorney of his choice, has 
entered his appearance herein and waived the statutory time in 
which to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff's Complaint, 
and has consented that Judgment by Default may be entered against 
him at any time and without further notice to him. 
Further, by his Appearanc* and Consent on file herein, the 
defendant has agreed that he will not bother, harass, annoy, 
threaten or harm the plaintiff at her place of residence, 
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and he 
has agreed to not to come in, on, or arcund the plaintiffs 
residence, place of employment or any place where plaintiff may 
be present. 
By his Appearance and Consent, defendant has agreed that h« 
way be permanently enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying, 
threatening or harming the plaintiff at her place of residence, 
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and that 
he may be restrained from coming in, on, or around the 
plaintiff's residence/ place of employment or any place where 
plaintiff nay be present. 
In additon, in his Appearance and Consent, the defendant has 
acknowledged that any appropriate peace officer shall render any 
necessary assistance to the plaintiff and that violations of any 
of the provisions of this permanent injunction may be deemed 
contemptuous and that the defendant could be punished 
accordingly. 
Eased upon the above and upon the Court's review of all the 
papers in this file, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises, and because of the irreparable harm which plaintiff 
-2-
could suffer if the defendant were to "get even" and carry «ut 
oth*r thr*ats he has made as set forth in the Complaint and 
plaintiffs Affidavit on file herein, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant, 
Frank Lifang, is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained XroBi_ 
bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening or harming the. _ „ 
plaintiff at her place of residence, employmentj?r anyjothar 
place in pejrson or by telephone, and said defendant, Frank 
Lifang, is permanently enjoined from coming in, on, or around tha 
plaintiff's residence, place of employment, or any place where 
plaintiff my be present; and in regard to this permanent 
injunction, any appropriate peace officer shall render any 
necessary assistance to the plaintiff. 
Violation of any of the provisions mentioned herein may b« 
deemed contemptuous and the defendant could be punished 
accordingly. 
This Judgment granting permanent injunction shall be binding 
upon the parties to this action, their officers,, agents, 
servants, employees and attorneys and upon those persons in 
active concert or participation with them vho receive notice, in 
person or through counsel, or otherwise, of this Judgment 
Granting Permanent Injunction, 
DATED this day of March, 1994-
J C l i m ^ y W ^ 4*BE COPY Of M 
OR«WA*fDO<^M^J,^f^CTK> TH6 TVWRO 
OSTHX^COURF^LPS^fc CQQNTV STATE 
BY THE J?g#$T: 
D i s t r i c t Cotfrt Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the iT4U clay of March, 1994, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Granting 
Permanent Injunction was mailed to the defendant, Frank Lifang, 
at 650 North Atlantis Drive, Oram, Utah 84057, by placing the 
same in the United States mails, postage prepaid, 
H* Mifflin Williams III 
